This week’s debate confronts us with complex questions that resist simple yes-or-no answers. As I worked through the readings, I was reminded of the film Unthinkable, which dramatizes a ticking-bomb scenario in which extreme measures are used to extract intelligence believed necessary to save thousands of lives. It leaves viewers with an unsettling question: if catastrophic harm is imminent, do moral boundaries shift?
The potential benefit of enhanced interrogation is clear, at least in theory and under special circumstances. In high-certainty, time-sensitive situations, coercive methods are argued to produce critical intelligence that may prevent mass casualties. However, both Lasson (2008) and Kutz (2014) complicate that assumption. Lasson notes that portrayals such as 24 create the misleading impression that torture reliably produces actionable intelligence, and military officials were concerned enough about this perception to push back against its normalization. Similarly, Kutz observes that many military and FBI professionals had internalized strong anti-torture norms, partly because experienced interrogators doubted the effectiveness and reliability of coercive methods.
Assessing whether enhanced interrogation “works” presents an empirical challenge. Much relevant data remains classified or contested, making firm conclusions difficult. Public evidence does not clearly establish that extreme coercion consistently yields reliable intelligence, particularly under the rigid assumptions of ticking-bomb scenarios. Lasson’s discussion of alternatives such as so-called truth serums is exploratory rather than supportive; he examines them pragmatically but remains skeptical of their reliability and legality (Lasson 2008). These readings suggest that while coercion may appear compelling in theory, its real-world effectiveness remains uncertain.
The debate therefore extends beyond effectiveness to credibility and legitimacy. As a democratic society, the United States claims commitment to legal and ethical norms. Kutz cautions that once a categorical prohibition (such as the ban on torture) is treated as negotiable, the norm itself begins to erode. Even if enhanced interrogation produces short-term intelligence gains, the long-term institutional costs may include weakened moral authority, strained alliances, and the gradual normalization of exceptional practices (Kutz 2014).
At the same time, one cannot ignore the psychological pressure facing decision-makers confronting imminent catastrophe. Even individuals deeply committed to ethical constraints may feel compelled to exhaust every possible measure to prevent mass casualties. O’Donohue et al. (2014) acknowledge this tension in exploring whether egregious wrongdoing might, in narrowly defined circumstances, justify overriding certain protections through a form of moral forfeiture grounded in Kantian reasoning. Yet this argument is explicitly exceptional and conditional; it does not endorse reciprocity or retaliation but frames the dilemma as a conflict of duties under extreme conditions.
Ultimately, the debate returns to the status of human rights themselves. While they are presented as universal and inviolable, their enforcement in practice is shaped by political realities and institutional constraints. International bodies often apply human rights unevenly, which can weaken their moral credibility. At the same time, the forfeiture argument (mentioned above) discussed by O’Donohue et al., drawing on Kant, complicates the assumption that rights are absolute in every circumstance. If an individual deliberately violates the most fundamental rights of others, such as the right to life, it raises the question of whether certain protections may be overridden under extreme conditions. This does not imply that human rights are arbitrary or disposable, but it does suggest that their application in cases of terrorism involves conflicts between competing moral claims rather than simple absolutes.
In sum, as a society and as intelligence professionals, we aim to do the decent thing and maintain ethical frameworks that align with the values we claim to uphold. Even if rare hypothetical cases can be imagined where coercion appears justified, institutionalizing such practices risks undermining the democratic and legal commitments they are meant to protect. The strategic and reputational costs may therefore exceed the uncertain tactical gains.
References
Kutz, Christopher. 2014. “How Norms Die: Torture and Assassination in American Security Policy.” Ethics & International Affairs 28 (4): 425–449.
Lasson, Kenneth. 2008. “Torture, Truth Serum, and Ticking Bombs: Toward a Pragmatic Perspective on Coercive Interrogation.” Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 39 (2): 329–356.
O’Donohue, William, Cassandra Snipes, Georgia Dalto, Cyndy Soto, Alexandros Maragakis, and Sungjin Im. 2014. “The Ethics of Enhanced Interrogations and Torture: A Reappraisal of the Argument.” Ethics & Behavior 27 (2): 109–125.