The main driver behind cooperation between criminal and terrorist groups is practical rather than ideological. Terrorist organizations often need funding, weapons, logistics, and access to established illicit networks, while criminal groups benefit from protection, expanded markets, and sometimes political leverage. As Perliger and Palmieri (2022) explain, factors such as organizational structure, group size, and the broader political and economic environment all influence the likelihood of this cooperation. In particular, weak governance, poor law enforcement capacity, and unregulated markets create fertile ground for both types of groups to emerge and thrive.
In these environments, cooperation does not necessarily require formal alliances. Groups often collaborate opportunistically, maintaining separate identities while exchanging resources and services. A good example is Hezbollah’s evolving network of relationships with criminal organizations. As it sought to diversify its revenue streams beyond reliance on Iran, Hezbollah developed ties with groups such as Medellín-based La Oficina de Envigado and Brazil’s First Capital Command, as well as individuals like arms dealer Ali Fayad and even corrupt government officials such as former Venezuelan lawmaker Adel El Zabayar (Myers 2011; Giambertoni 2025). These actors do not share Hezbollah’s ideological goals, but they find mutual benefit in cooperation. As Perliger and Palmieri (2022) argue, such collaboration strengthens both sides by enabling skill-sharing, expanding recruitment networks, and increasing operational reach. Criminal groups provide expertise in evading law enforcement, while terrorist groups contribute tactical and operational experience.
This same dynamic also helps explain why such cooperation is so difficult to interrupt. Weak and corrupt states play a central role. When governments lack the capacity to enforce laws, regulate markets, or secure borders, both criminal and terrorist networks can operate with relative freedom. Addressing these structural issues, such as economic instability, corruption, and weak institutions, is extremely difficult, which allows these networks not only to persist but also to deepen their cooperation over time.
From a legal perspective, the challenge becomes even more complex. Saul (2017) points out that while terrorism and transnational crime are deeply intertwined in practice, international law still treats them as separate categories. This creates ambiguity in classification and prosecution, leading to fragmented enforcement. Different legal frameworks, agencies, and jurisdictions often handle different aspects of the same network, making coordinated disruption difficult. As a result, detecting and combating these hybrid networks is hindered by legal gaps, institutional silos, and the transnational nature of their operations.
Bersin and Karlsson (2019) add another layer to this problem by arguing that modern criminal and terrorist networks operate through global “flows” of money, goods, people, and data that move across borders continuously, while governments still rely on traditional, territorial approaches to enforcement. In simple terms, criminals cooperate globally, but governments often do not. Weak intelligence sharing, limited coordination among international institutions, and fragmented enforcement structures further complicate disruption efforts.
Even within a single country, internal fragmentation can create obstacles. Rivalries between counterterrorism units and organized crime agencies, lack of intelligence sharing, and overlapping operations can undermine effectiveness. In some cases, political considerations can also interfere. For example, reporting on the DEA’s Project Cassandra suggests that efforts targeting Hezbollah’s criminal networks, including money laundering and drug trafficking, were scaled back due to broader political priorities tied to negotiations with Iran (Deutsche Welle 2026). This illustrates how strategic decisions at the national level can hinder efforts to disrupt these networks.
Overall, cooperation between criminals and terrorists is driven by mutual benefit and enabled by weak governance, while its disruption is complicated by legal ambiguity, institutional fragmentation, and the transnational, networked nature of these actors.
References:
Bersin, Alan, and Lars Karlsson. 2019. “Lines, Flows and Transnational Crime: Toward a Revised Approach to Countering the Underworld of Globalization.” Homeland Security Affairs 15.
Deutsche Welle. 2026. Unmasking Hezbollah. YouTube documentary, March 9.
Giambertoni, Marzia. 2025. Hezbollah’s Networks in Latin America. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
Myers, Thomas. 2011. “Terrorist to Tyrant.” Homeland Security Affairs 7 (February): Article 6.
Perliger, Arie, and Michael Palmieri. 2022. “Mapping Connections and Cooperation between Terrorist and Criminal Entities.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 45 (5–6): 335–347.
Saul, Ben. 2017. “The Legal Relationship between Terrorism and Transnational Crime.” International Criminal Law Review 17: 417–452.