What changed between 2019, when Iran’s Supreme Leader told Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe that Trump was “not worthy” of a response, and 2025, when Tehran now replies to Trump’s letter and signals openness to indirect talks? In short: everything.
The ruling regime in Tehran now fully realizes it has lost the support of the majority of the population. Increasing anti-regime protests and recent elections—with record-low voter turnout—have only confirmed this fact. Even its so-called loyal base is growing restless, and the regime is scrambling to maintain their satisfaction.
The Iranian economy is in tatters. Talk of development is almost laughable amid compounding crises: fuel shortages, an energy grid in decline, extreme environmental degradation, and dangerously high levels of air pollution. The continued loss of value of the national currency has had both material and psychological consequences—eroding public trust, fueling a growing desire to emigrate, and triggering widespread anxiety about the future.
The regime’s string of foreign and regional policy failures has finally broken the camel’s back. For years, Tehran operated with a sense of strategic confidence, relying on its network of proxies in Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen to assert influence and respond to Western pressure. But that model has eroded. Its once-reliable deterrents are now either weakened, contested, or diplomatically costly. Add to that the sobering realization that deepening ties with China and Russia have failed to deliver the geopolitical leverage or economic salvation Tehran had envisioned.
Nowhere is this collapse more visible—and more humiliating—than in Syria. Iran invested heavily in propping up Bashar al-Assad, portraying its military and economic presence there as a major regional success. Syria was the linchpin of its strategy to maintain open lines to Hezbollah and Hamas, and served as a key propaganda tool for projecting strength to its domestic audience. The fall of Assad not only undercut Tehran’s regional ambitions, but also dealt a symbolic and strategic blow that exposed the hollowness of its so-called “axis of resistance.”
Domestically, it shattered a narrative the regime had spent over a decade building. Internationally, it signaled a decisive failure.
This response to Trump’s letter should not be mistaken for a genuine shift in the regime’s nature or intentions. The Islamic Republic is not about to become a normal state, nor is it likely to engage with the West in good faith—it simply cannot, because doing so would contradict its very nature. However, the fact that it has responded at all is, in itself, a significant development—a direct consequence of shifting conditions brought about by sustained pressure.
In a nutshell: yes, pressure works.