Ethical and legal rules governing collateral damage and civilian casualties are meant to limit the harm war inflicts on noncombatants. As Cocking (2012) explains, one of the key moral distinctions in warfare is between intending harm and merely foreseeing it. Under international humanitarian law, civilians may not be intentionally targeted, even when military operations take place in populated areas. Respecting this distinction helps protect civilian populations and places moral limits on the conduct of war. It can also preserve the legitimacy of military operations by showing that armed forces are trying to minimize harm to innocent people and act within accepted legal and ethical boundaries.
At the same time, failing to follow these principles can have serious consequences. When civilians are deliberately targeted, or when military actors show little regard for the likely impact of their actions on civilian populations, the result can be international condemnation, accusations of war crimes, and a loss of moral and political legitimacy. Civilian casualties can also deepen anger among affected communities and increase resistance against the attacking force. For that reason, ethical conduct in war is not only a moral obligation but also an important factor in maintaining credibility and limiting the long term consequences of armed conflict.
I also think these questions feel very different when discussed during an actual war rather than in a time of relative peace. Over the past thirteen days, civilians, including children, have been killed in military operations in Iran, even if they were not the intended targets. That reality kept coming to mind as I read this week’s passages, especially Zehfuss (2012). Zehfuss questions whether the distinction between intended and unintended killing really protects civilians at all, since military actors often know civilian deaths are likely yet still describe them as collateral damage. Her point is unsettling because it suggests that the language of ethics can sometimes make civilian deaths easier to justify rather than harder to prevent.
At the same time, applying that critique in real military operations is not always simple. High value military targets in places like Iran or Gaza are often surrounded by family members, aides, or other civilians. In such cases, avoiding all civilian casualties may be impossible, while waiting for a perfect opportunity may mean allowing further violence or prolonging the conflict. In addition, although Israeli and U.S. forces sometimes issue advance warnings about planned strikes and their intended targets, the Iranian government’s nationwide internet shutdown may prevent many civilians from receiving those warnings in time.
That tension shows how hard it is to translate ethical theory into operational reality. Ideally, discussions of collateral damage should bring moral theorists and military planners into the same conversation so that ethical principles are weighed alongside the practical constraints of warfare.
References:
Cocking, Dean. 2012. “Collateral Damage: Intending Evil and Doing Evil.” In Protecting Civilians During Violent Conflict: Theoretical and Practical Issues for the 21st Century, edited by David W. Lovell, 79–92. London: Routledge.
Zehfuss, Maja. 2012. “Killing Civilians: Thinking the Practice of War.” The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 14: 423–440.