The terms strategic communication and public diplomacy are widely used across the U.S. interagency, particularly within the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the National Security Council. According to Paul (2011), strategic communication refers to a coordinated, whole-of-government effort that integrates words, deeds, images, and other forms of signaling to influence selected audiences in support of national objectives. Public diplomacy, by contrast, is a government-to-foreign-public function centered on engagement, outreach, exchange, and international broadcasting, and is traditionally associated with the Department of State.
Paul’s notional diagram (2011, 41) reinforces an overlap model (not a strict hierarchy) among strategic communication, public diplomacy, and information operations. Strategic communication functions as an umbrella that can coordinate public diplomacy, public affairs, information operations, and policy actions. Public diplomacy operates within that framework when aligned with national objectives, but some public diplomacy efforts remain intentionally insulated by design, particularly those focused on long-term engagement rather than immediate policy outcomes.
U.S. policy toward Iran during the first Trump administration provides a useful example of this distinction in practice, given the clear shift in strategic objectives and signaling. At the strategic level, the administration pursued a pressure-based objective aimed at compelling the Islamic Republic to alter its regional behavior and internal conduct. Strategic communication disciplined interagency messaging and action toward this goal, as reflected in sanctions policy, deterrence signaling, and consistent framing of the regime as malign, destabilizing, and illegitimate across the Treasury Department, the Pentagon, and the State Department. The withdrawal from the JCPOA thus represented the culmination of a coherent signaling trajectory.
Within this strategic framework, public diplomacy adopted a markedly confrontational posture. Campaigns emphasized exposing the regime’s brutality toward its own population, its export of terrorism through proxy violence and overseas attacks, and the corruption and hypocrisy of regime elites (Iran Action Group 2018). These efforts relied on documented evidence, credible reporting, and first-hand testimony rather than narrative invention. Human rights abuses, economic predation, and the violent suppression of protests and labor movements were foregrounded in ways that aligned closely with long-standing grievances inside Iranian society.
Viewed through a cognitive lens, this approach reflects what Bernays described as the organization and activation of existing beliefs rather than the creation of new ones (Bernays 1928). Public diplomacy messaging reduced cognitive resistance by amplifying realities already salient to target audiences. It also aligned with Cialdini’s principles of influence, particularly authority, consistency, and social proof (Cialdini 2009). Credibility was reinforced through official documentation and sanctions designations, while widespread dissent was highlighted to signal that opposition to the regime was collective rather than isolated. In Paul’s terms, the case illustrates how public diplomacy can operate as a cognitively effective component within a broader strategic communication framework, while remaining distinct in function, audience, and method.
References:
Bernays, Edward L. 1928. Propaganda. New York: Horace Liveright.
Borger, Julian, and Patrick Wintour. 2017. “US Gives Evidence Iran Supplied Missiles That Yemen Rebels Fired at Saudi Arabia.” Guardian, December 14, 2017.
Cialdini, Robert B. 2009. Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion. New York: HarperCollins Publishers.
Iran Action Group. 2018. Outlaw Regime: A Chronicle of Iran’s Destructive Activities. U.S. Department of State.
Paul, Christopher. 2011. Strategic Communication: Origins, Concepts, and Current Debates. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International.
** Additional Note:
Strategic communication and public diplomacy are tools designed to advance national-level objectives. Their effectiveness, however, cannot be evaluated in isolation from the underlying policy itself. If the overarching policy goal is flawed, even the most disciplined messaging and coordination across the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and other agencies cannot correct that flaw. Strategic communication and public diplomacy are essential and demand careful planning, a solid understanding of influence processes, and deep knowledge of target audiences. Still, policy outcomes are shaped by many external and unpredictable factors. Sound intelligence and analysis can clarify these dynamics prior to policy making, but they cannot eliminate uncertainty.
Time is another element that is often overlooked in policy assessment. Judgments about effectiveness can differ significantly when viewed in the short term versus across a longer historical arc, particularly in the case of volatile states with aggressive postures toward U.S. interests. Looking back in retrospect, I see a gradual maturation in U.S. policy toward Iran that reflects changing conditions on the ground, both inside Iran and internationally, and evolving assessments of U.S. strategic interests.
As I see it, the Obama administration pursued engagement, and the Trump administration pursued pressure, both with the goal of bringing the Islamic Republic into global conformity and compliance. The JCPOA itself makes this clear in its preface, where the signatories anticipated that full implementation would contribute positively to regional and international peace and security. In other words, although the agreement was often presented as narrowly focused on nuclear containment, there was an implicit expectation that it might also moderate the regime’s broader behavior. That expectation was not borne out.
With the exception of observable compliance in certain nuclear commitments, limited to what could be externally verified, Tehran’s broader regional and security behavior largely reverted to its prior pattern immediately after the agreement was secured and well before the transition to the next administration. Missile testing continued as a form of defiance, terrorist proxy groups were strengthened, human rights abuses persisted, and the detention of dual nationals for leverage did not stop. I do not believe these outcomes were the result of faulty strategic communication or public diplomacy. Nor do I think the policy of engagement was entirely misguided at the time, given the level of domestic support the regime still retained, as reflected in electoral participation rates.
For the Obama administration, securing a nuclear agreement was an achievable policy objective, and strategic communication and public diplomacy were effectively aligned in support of that goal. Expecting a broader normalization of behavior from the regime in Tehran, however, was not an achievable outcome, regardless of how effectively strategic communication or public diplomacy were executed or which administration followed Obama. The same alignment between policy, strategic communication, and public diplomacy can be observed during the Trump administration’s first term, this time in support of a pressure-based approach.