OSINT Communities
The Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) occupies a unique position within the Intelligence Community. Unlike most intelligence organizations, INR’s primary mission is to support the Secretary of State and U.S. diplomats around the world. To strengthen its use of open-source intelligence, INR established a dedicated Open Source Coordination Unit in 2022 to provide institutional focus and coordination for OSINT activities across the bureau. This mission gives INR a particularly strong incentive to leverage open-source information because OSINT products can often be shared more broadly with diplomats, allies, foreign partners, and policymakers who may not have access to highly classified intelligence (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research 2024).
One of INR’s greatest strengths is its ability to draw from growing volumes of publicly and commercially available information, combine those sources with regional expertise, and rapidly provide insights to decision-makers. This rapid turnaround and the shareability of open-source information are particularly valuable in support of diplomatic engagement, foreign policy discussions, and coordination with international partners in ways that many other intelligence products cannot match. INR’s partnerships with academia, industry, think tanks, civil society organizations, and allied governments also allow it to incorporate a wide range of perspectives and expertise into its analysis (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research 2024).
At the same time, INR faces many of the same challenges confronting the broader Intelligence Community. These include managing the enormous and rapidly growing volume of publicly available information, developing effective governance and legal safeguards, acquiring and maintaining access to commercial data and analytical tools, and training personnel in increasingly specialized OSINT tradecraft. Analysts must also contend with disinformation campaigns, manipulated media, and AI-generated content that can complicate efforts to validate information and assess credibility. Interestingly, these challenges are not unique to INR. The Department of Defense, for example, identifies many of the same concerns in leveraging OSINT despite its very different mission (U.S. Department of Defense 2023). Both organizations emphasize the need for specialized expertise, workforce development, technological innovation, stronger governance frameworks, and partnerships outside government (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research 2024; U.S. Department of Defense 2023). This overlap naturally leads to a broader debate about whether the Intelligence Community needs a dedicated OSINT agency.
There are compelling arguments on both sides of this debate. Supporters of a dedicated OSINT agency argue that open-source intelligence has become a highly specialized discipline that deserves the same level of professionalization as HUMINT, SIGINT, or GEOINT. Gauthier (2025) argues that the information revolution and advances in artificial intelligence have fundamentally transformed the intelligence environment, making OSINT a critical source of national power. He contends that dispersing OSINT capabilities across eighteen Intelligence Community organizations creates duplication, bureaucratic complexity, and inconsistent implementation. Similarly, former Assistant Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Open Source Eliot Jardines argues that OSINT is often treated as a secondary responsibility inside agencies whose primary focus remains classified collection. In his view, only a dedicated agency can provide the funding, acquisition authorities, training programs, certifications, and career paths necessary for OSINT to reach its full potential (Host 2025).
Others are less convinced that creating another agency would solve the problem. Vogel (2024) argues that many of the obstacles facing OSINT are cultural rather than organizational. Despite multiple reform efforts over the past several decades, intelligence professionals have often continued to place greater trust in classified information than in open sources. Research cited by Vogel suggests that analysts may assign greater credibility to classified reporting even when identical information is available through open sources. This suggests that simply creating a new agency may not address the deeper biases, incentives, and funding priorities that have historically limited OSINT’s role. James Dickey, a veteran intelligence practitioner, makes a similar argument, warning that a new agency could create additional bureaucracy while doing little to improve how OSINT is actually used. Instead, he advocates stronger governance, dedicated funding mechanisms, and clearer authorities within existing agencies (Host 2025).
In my opinion, the evidence, particularly the challenges identified by both INR and the Department of Defense, strongly points to the need for greater professionalization of OSINT through dedicated career fields, specialized training, certification standards, and stronger acquisition authorities. At the same time, I am not convinced that creating an entirely new agency is necessary, at least not at this stage. OSINT often provides its greatest value when it is integrated with HUMINT, SIGINT, GEOINT, and other intelligence disciplines rather than operating separately from them. For that reason, I believe a strengthened ODNI-led OSINT enterprise with centralized standards, governance, and acquisition authority would be more effective than establishing a standalone agency. Such an approach would preserve the benefits of specialization while keeping OSINT analysts embedded within organizations such as INR, CIA, DIA, NSA, NGA, FBI, and DoD components, where they can directly support mission requirements. It would also continue to leverage the innovation, expertise, and technological advantages available through partnerships with the private sector, academia, and allied nations.
References:
Host, Pat. 2025. “OSINT: Should the US Create an Open Source Intelligence Agency? Experts Discuss.” Potomac Officers Club, September 16, 2025.
U.S. Department of Defense. 2023. Department of Defense OSINT Strategy 2024–2028. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense. October 23, 2023.
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research. 2024. Open Source Intelligence Strategy. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research. May 2024.
Vogel, Kathleen M. 2024. “OSINT and the US Intelligence Community: Is the Past Prologue?” In Open Source Investigations in the Age of Google, edited by Henrietta Wilson, Olamide Samuel, and Dan Plesch, 188–203. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing.